Was apparent al-Queda member and former worker at US nuclear power stations Sharif Mobley working in Yemen on a plot to attack US nuclear facilities?
Today’s fast-moving developments regarding apparent American Al-Queda member and former Buena, New Jersey resident Sharif Mobley could add up to another lucky near-miss for America regarding a pending al-Qaida terrorist attack on the homeland. On Christmas 2009, America was blessed by quick-thinking passengers and perhaps a faulty fuse which stopped Nigerian al-Qaida terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab from blowing up Northwest Airlines flight 253 over suburban Detroit. Today, we learn that Somali-American jihadist Sharif Mobley, who has apparently lived in Yemen since late 2008 and was recently detained in a Yemeni security sweep for al-Qaida militants and reportedly killed a Yemeni guard in an escape attempt, worked extensively at several US nuclear power plants from 2002-2008.
Back in 2002, 9/11 mastermind Khaled al-Sheikh Mohammed (“KSM”) was interviewed by Spanish newspaper El Mundo, and KSM had this to say about attacking US nuclear facilities:
The idea came several years later from al-Qaida’s military committee when it decided to refine a previously aborted plan – to fly airliners into 12 major American buildings – “in order to cause the greatest possible number of deaths and deal a huge blow to America on its own soil”, according to Mohammed. “It was decided to abandon nuclear targets for the moment,” Mohammed explained. “I mean for the moment,” he added.
It seems clear from KSM’s comments that an attack on US nuclear facilities has been on the radar for al-Qaida for quite some time and is a long term goal for the terrorist group. Sharif Mobley’s many years (2002-2008) of access to secure portions of US nuclear facilities, even during period of time well after his apparent radicalization (2006 comment to acquaintance and Army veteran Ramon Castro, “Get the hell away from me, you Muslim killer!”), creates the possibility that Mobley was recruited by al-Qaida to travel to Yemen and plan a possible al-Qaida attack on a US nuclear power plant, perhaps one to which Mobley previously had access. The Congressional Research Service has specifically warned of the vulnerability of nuclear power stations to a potential terrorist attack.
While the full extent of Mobley’s prior work experience is unclear, it appears that for six years (2002-2008), he “carried supplies and did maintenance work at the plants on Artificial Island in Lower Alloways Creek, and worked at other plants in the region as well.” As such, Mobley very likely had substantial knowledge of the physical layout of several US nuclear facilities and perhaps some information on security at those facilities. It is possible that Mobley may have been working with al-Qaida on a plan in which Mobley would return to the United States, regain his work position which allowed access to US nuclear power stations, and use that access to facilitate an attack by al-Qaida on a US nuclear power plant. Perhaps Mobley’s prior work history at nuclear installations and al-Qaida’s clearly stated goal to launch an attack on a US nuclear installation is simply a coincidence.
At a very minimum, an immediate review of the security procedures of US nuclear power plants should be commenced considering Mobley obtained a security clearance as late as 2008, despite exhibiting signs of Islamic extremism years before. Regardless, in coming days, we can expect politicians to begin asking these types of questions and for a full review of the entirety of US investigations and intelligence, if any, that existed on Mobley before the public exposure of his detainment in Yemen. This November 2009 interview of former CIA operations officer Charles S. Faddis demonstrates both the desirability of nuclear power plants to terrorists as a target and the potentially unimaginable damage from a successful terror attack:
Q. In relation to the previous question, and given that the 9/11 attack was carried within the U.S. territory, would you agree that a terrorist attack using WMD might be more likely to occur by disrupting/destroying facilities inside the U.S. (such as nuclear power plants), rather than through an action carried from abroad?
I think that our enemies have shown that they are clever, adaptable and brutal. They are very good at finding ways to avoid our defenses and security measures and turn our perceived strengths against us. If a terrorist group can seize and meltdown a nuclear power plant on U.S. soil, it can avoid all of the technological hurdles inherent in building a nuclear weapon. A nuclear reactor will not explode like an atomic bomb, but the radiation produced by a meltdown could kill tens of thousands and render huge areas uninhabitable for generations. We need to pay considerably more attention to the security of our nuclear power plants in the United States and substantially enhance their defenses.
UPDATE: Hotair links over, thanks for the link, re the speculation of Mobley’s possible role in AQIY. Ed makes an interesting point about Mobley’s intel value to AQIY:
But did AQ intend to attack nuclear power plants in the US with Mobley as its point person? Fox News reports that their sources in “law enforcement” don’t see a link between his work before leaving the country and whatever AQ had in mind when it sent him back. It could just be coincidental, as a trip toYemen to study Islam and Arabic would almost certainly have raised red flags in a recertification process. Mobley may have been more valuable in supplying intel on security procedures rather than as a terrorist attacker.
Undoubtedly, AQ sees nuclear-power plants as a highly desirable target, despite their occasional enviro-freak posturing. The fact is that we don’t have enough facts to say one way or the other, and speculation isn’t the same as fact. He could just as easily been considered a potential assassin based on his access to political campaigns. At the least, though, this should be considered a serious leak for nuclear security, and stations should adjust their protocols accordingly.
